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NATIONAL SECURITY V. THE RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED: THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE
INTRODUCTION
[Aibstract principles announcing the applicability of civil liberties
during times of war and crisis are ineffectual when a war or other
crisis comes along unless the principles are fleshed out by a de-
tailed jurisprudence explaining how those civil liberties will be
sustained against particularized national security concerns.1
U.S. Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
The Israeli legal system lives in two time warps. In Israel proper,
the rule of law stands on firm ground and Israeli citizens are en-
dowed with the basic freedoms and rights inherent in a democratic
society. Across the green line,2 the military government is responsi-
ble for the civil administration of the Israeli Occupied Territories.
When ordinary law is suspended, the local inhabitants are faced
with the realities of martial law. Although not directly connected to
the administration of the military justice system, the Israeli legal
system bears alarming similarities to its counterpart in the Occu-
pied Territories: the security laws used by the military as a means
of suppression of the Palestinian population are identical to those
security laws in force in Israel. The wide scale implementation of
such laws in the West Bank and Gaza has demonstrated their bru-
tal nature and their disregard for human rights.
The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate that the mere
existence of these security laws in the Israeli law books creates the
potential for their wide scale application within Israel, and to illus-
trate that a future emergency could lead to the realization of this
potential. In so doing, this Comment will demonstrate how this se-
curity legislation poses a serious threat to the civil liberties of Is-
raeli citizens.
Section I will provide a general background of the Israeli legal
1. W. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times
of Security Crisis, 18 Is. Y.B. OF H.R. 11, 19 (1988).
2. The green line is the recognized international border between Israel and the West
Bank and Gaza, territories occupied by Israel in the Six Day War in June, 1967.
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system. The first part of this discussion focuses on an axiom which
constitutes the basis of the Israeli legal system: without a written
constitution, the executive and legislative branches of the Israeli
government are unrestrained in the enactment of laws. Because the
judiciary is required to enforce all laws, it is the subordinate branch
of government. The second part explains how the Israel Supreme
Court has overcome this impediment and succeeded in establishing
basic freedoms.
Section II shows that Israeli Criminal Procedure distinguishes
between two types of offenses-typical criminal offenses and secur-
ity offenses. Only those accused of typical offenses are provided
with the procedural safeguards required for a fair trial. Those sus-
pected of security offenses face obstacles depriving them of their
procedural rights.
Section III explains the Emergency laws which can activate
those procedural obstacles. Since these laws have rarely been used
in Israel, an analysis of their utilization in the Israeli Occupied
Territories will demonstrate their effect on the rights of the ac-
cused. This analysis is included in Section IV. In addition, Section
IV discusses the recent Palestinian uprising and further demon-
strates how a sudden emergency can lead to the widespread imple-
mentation of the harsh security measures sanctioned by these laws.
Finally, Section V questions whether in the absence of a detailed
jurisprudence, Israeli law can protect civil liberties during a na-
tional emergency. Two recent trends concerning the Supreme Court
of Israel can be identified. The first trend relates to the ascendancy
of the Supreme Court in the balance of governmental power and its
increasing role in scrutinizing the actions of the executive. How-
ever, the second trend, which concerns judicial interpretation of
criminal law, concedes that even a strong judiciary can be influ-
enced by the dictates of national security.
I. THE ISRAELI SYSTEM OF LAW
A. The Origins of Israeli Law
The Israeli system of law is eclectic. It absorbed the legal sys-
tems which preceded the establishment of Israel, and integrated the
Jewish law tradition. The result is a legal structure founded upon
an amalgamation of legal currents which meet the complex needs
of the State's culture.
Palestine, which included the territories of Israel prior to its es-
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tablishment, was ruled by the Ottoman Empire until the end of
World War I. It then fell into the hands of the British. Great Brit-
ain governed Palestine by military rule from 1918 to 1922, and
then by mandatory authority until May 14, 1948, the date Israel
was established.'
The complexities of Israeli law are a product of evolution. The
Ottoman law which preceded both the British and Israeli legal sys-
tems was a mixture of the French Code and Islamic law.' After the
British takeover, English law was instituted in two ways: 1)
through new legislation codifying English common law, and 2) by
the enactment of Article 46 of the Palestine Order in Council,
which established common law as legal precedent in Palestine.'
The establishment of Israel on May 14, 1948 did not erase the
prior legal systems. Instead, Ottoman and English laws were re-
tained in order to leave an interim legal structure and to provide a
foundation for future Israeli law.' As Israel progressed, the legisla-
ture endeavored to adapt the Ottoman and English laws to the par-
ticular needs of the country-those laws contradictory to Israeli le-
gal requirements were replaced by new Israeli enactments.7 At
present, most of the Ottoman rules have been invalidated. Never-
theless, some Ottoman elements remain in the current system.8
In 1948, the new Israeli Court relied on English common law
precedents in place. While English common law continues to play a
role in Israeli adjudication, it does not constitute "stare decisis."
The Israel court may interpret and analyze the English precedents,
but they are not binding on the court's decisions and judicial rea-
soning.9 However, the influence of the English system is prominent.
3. The British mandate over Palestine was established by Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations. Accordingly, Great Britain became the trustee responsible for the
administration of Palestine after the breakup of the Ottoman empire.
4. 16 AMER. J. COMp. L. 405, 406 (1968).
5. Id.
6. Law and Administrative Ordinance, § I1, Laws of the State of Israel (L.S.I.)
(1948). Section 11 of the Proclamation, a document enacted by the Provisional Government,
stated:
So long as no laws have been enacted by or on behalf of the Provisional Counsel of
State, the law which existed in Palestine on May 14, 1948, shall continue in force in
the State of Israel, insofar as such continuance in form is consistent with the con-
tents of this proclamation, with the future laws and with the changes arising from
the establishment of the State and its authorities.
7. For example, Ottoman laws regulating marriage and divorce, which were based on
Islamic law, were superseded by Jewish law.
8. Cohn, The Spirit of Israeli Law, 9 Is. L. REV. 456, 458 (1974). One example is the
Evidence Ordinance law, which provides that a prior decision in a criminal cause of action is
res judicata in a civil cause of action.
9. Judicial and Administrative Ordinance (amended 1972) 1948; S.H. No. 651, at 51.
1989]
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One commentator has noted that the "manner of discussion, the
mode of reasoning and general approach [of the Israeli system] are
characteristics of the common law system.' Due to changing social
and economic conditions, the Israeli courts have also demonstrated
a willingness to consider U.S. precedents. The opinions of Israeli
judges, which are typically lengthy, often contain references to de-
cisions made by the U.S. courts. 1
The origins of Israeli criminal procedure can also be found in the
prior Ottoman and English law systems. The Ottoman Penal Code
of 1858, a blend of French and Islamic law, was in force in Pales-
tine until 1936.12 In that year, the British enacted the Criminal
Code Ordinances of 1936. This code repealed most of the Ottoman
provisions, and was, in effect, a codification of English common law
relating to criminal procedure.' Although the Criminal Code Ordi-
nances of 1936 were replaced by the Israeli Criminal Procedure
Law of 1965, and the Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Ver-
sion) of 1982, the 1936 Code greatly influenced the Israeli codes.'
Another significant similarity between English law and Israeli
law is that Israel does not have a written constitution. Although
this has resulted more from circumstance than through inheritance,
the Israeli and English systems function in a similar way. In order
10. Friedman, Infusion of the Common Law in the Legal System of Israel, 10 Is. L.
REV. 325, 327 (1979).
11. In a famous defamation case, the Israel Supreme Court utilized the rationale of
N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in order to strike a balance between the right
to privacy and freedom of expression. Ha'aretz Newspaper Publication Ltd. et. al. v. Israeli
Electricity Corp. Ltd., 31 (11) P.D. 281 (1977).
Section 20(6) of the Basic Law Concerning Adjudication states: "A decision rendered by
the Supreme Court is binding on all courts except the Supreme Court." Basic Law: Adjudi-
cation S.H. (1984) No. 1110. p. 78. Because the Supreme Court of Israel is not bound by its
own precedents, it has the freedom to adopt the decisions of foreign courts.
12. Bach, Development of Criminal Law in Israel During the Twenty-five Years of its
Existence, 9 Is. L REV. 568, 569 (1974).
13. Id. at 568.
14. After May 1948, Israeli Criminal Procedure evolved through an unsystematic pro-
cess consisting of 1) amendments to the Criminal Code Ordinances of 1936, and 2) enact-
ments of new laws in areas not addressed by the Criminal Code Ordinances. See, Bach,
supra note I1, at 569.
The Israeli Criminal Procedure Law of 1965, 19 L.S.I. 158, repealed the Criminal Code
Ordinance of 1936. However, in substance, many of the procedures of the 1965 code are
English in character: "Proceedings are accusatory rather than inquisitory and the judge
takes little active part in their conduct. They are instituted by filing a statement of charge
and conducted by police officers or attorneys of the State Attorney's Department. The ac-
cused enjoys the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent, confessions are
admissable only if made freely and voluntarily." The Israel Criminal Procedure Law of
1965, reprinted in THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES 2 (1967). The Crimi-
nal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version) of 1982, L.S.I. 1043, consolidated all prior enact-
ments and amended laws concerning arrests and seizures.
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to protect the civil liberties of their citizens, England and Israel
rely on fundamental rights inherent in their own common law.
"Protections are present as a result of the will of the people repre-
sented by the common law which the English courts have always
. . . enforced and which the Supreme Court of Israel has . . . been
enforcing in [Israel], without any Bill of Rights."15
B. Basic Freedoms Without a Written Constitution
Israel has failed to create a superior normative document which
elevates fundamental rights over the actions of the government de-
spite several attempts to do so.1" Such a failure is the result of
Israel's precarious security situation and the difficulty of drafting a
document acceptable to all segments of Israel's heterogenous
population."
Israel's Declaration of Independence is the only document which
sets forth constitutional principles. The Declaration states:
The State of Israel . . will foster the development of the country
for all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and
peace envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete
equality of socio-political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective
of religion, conscience, language, education and culture.'8
In 1953, the Supreme Court of Israel determined that the Declara-
tion of Independence was only a political document announcing
Israel's democratic nature. Although not binding authority, it could
be referred to by the courts when interpreting the laws of the
state. 9 The Declaration is an example of how "the basic political,
15. Lord Diplock, On the Unwritten Constitution, 9 Is. L. REV. 463, 464 (1974).
16. The first Knesset was a constituent assembly; however, with the immediate out-
break of the War of Independence, this assembly was empowered with legislative authority.
Although hearings concerning the constitution were held, the original purpose of the first
Knesset was not achieved. Instead, a compromise was reached whereby a committee was set
up to draft what is called the Basic Law--chapters of a constitution, each of which was to be
drafted separately, and were to constitute a basic (fundamental) law. So far, the Knesset has
passed eight Basic Laws relating to the president, the Knesset, the government, the Army,
state budgets and financing, state lands and Jerusalem. Previous failures to enact a written
constitution were caused by conflicting ideologies concerning the nature of the state. Gavison,
The Controversy Over Israeli Bill of Rights, 15 Is. Y.B.H.R. 113 (1984). Presently, there
have been renewed efforts to draft a constitution.
17. The vast majority of Israelis, who are Jews, are divided into many different ethnic
groups. In addition, ideological differences between secular and religious Jews have led to
public dissension. The minority of Israelis, approximately 700,000, consist of Muslims, Druze
and Christians. Shetreet, International Protection of Human Rights is Israeli Law, ISRAEL
REPORTS TO THE TWELFTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 332, 333
(1986).
18. Official Gazette, No. 1, 1 L.S.I. 3-5 (May 14, 1948).
19. Kol Ha'am v. Minister of the Interior, 7 P.D. 871 (1953). The court stated:
19891
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economic, social and cultural values of Israel were to be found
within, and not above, its legal system." 2
In the absence of a written constitution, the Supreme Court of
Israel cannot strike down a law: "[e]very law or part of a law
which is passed by the Knesset must be enforced."2 In addition,
the decisions of the Supreme Court are susceptible to circumven-
tion through ex post facto legislation and administrative emergency
legislation.22 Therefore, the judiciary is the subordinate branch of
government.2 3
Although the judiciary does not have equal standing with the
Knesset, civil rights have not been seriously curtailed. Viewing it-
self as the sole guardian against governmental impropriety, the Su-
preme Court of Israel has prevented the erosion of civil liberties
and kept the government in check.24 It has accomplished this by
internalizing the legal norms of a democratic society through judge-
made law. For instance, in the Ha'aretz Newspaper case, the Su-
preme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice,25 acknowledged
The matters set forth in the Declaration of Independence-especially as regards
basing the State "on the foundations of freedom" and securing freedom of con-
science-mean that Israel is a freedom loving State. It is true that the Declaration
"does not include any constitutional law laying down in fact any rule regarding the
maintaining or repeal of any ordinances or laws" but insofar as it "expresses the
vision of the people and its faith". We are bound to pay attention to the matters set
forth therein when we come to interpret and give meaning to the laws of the
State . ..
Id. at 871.
20. 16 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 405, 409 (1968).
21. H/C 188/63 Bazzu v. Minister of Interior, 19 P.D. 337, 349.
22. Shetreet, Judicial Independence and Accountability in Israel, 33 INT'L AND COMP.
L.Q. 979, 981 (1984).
23. The Israeli government is based on a one house (the Knesset) parliamentary sys-
tem. The executive consists of members of the Knesset from the leading party. "The
Supremacy of the Knesset is the cornerstone of the legal system." Bracha, The Protection of
Human Rights in Israel, 12 Is. Y.B.H.R. 110, 111 (1982). This is the result of (I) absence of
a written constitution, (2) Section I of the Transition Law of 1949 which granted the con-
stituent assembly legislative authority, and (3) the rule that the judiciary will not validate
any rules which contradict the laws enacted by the Knesset. See Likhouski, The Courts and
the Legislative Supremacy of the Knesset, 3 Is. L. REV. 345 (1968).
Since the Knesset is led by the executive, the governmental apparatus is designed to afford
it the power to enact injudicial legislation via the Knesset. Therefore, civil rights are not
beyond the reach of the government.
24. The independence of the Supreme Court is an established principle in Israel. This
is accomplished by the selection committee in charge of nominating Supreme Court judges.
The membership of the committee is designed to ensure objective and neutral selection and is
composed of three Supreme Court judges, two lawyers, two members of Knesset, the Minis-
ter of Justice, and an additional Cabinet Minister. Judges are appointed for life with a
mandatory retirement age of seventy. Judges Law of 1953, 7 L.S.I. 124.
25. The Israeli Supreme Court has two functions, Appellate Court and High Court of
Justice. As High Court of Justice, the Court has the power to grant writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus, certiorari and prohibition, as well as declaratory orders. Courts Law of 1957,
[Vol. 20
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that even without a constitution, basic individual rights are inherent
in the laws of Israel.26 In another case, the Court asserted that
freedom of expression belongs "to those unwritten rights which di-
rectly emanate from the democratic character of our country as a
freedom loving State."27
In Kremer, et. al. v. Municipality of Jerusalem, et. al.,28 the Su-
preme Court elaborated on its function:
In our state, lacking a constitution which protects the individual's
fundamental freedoms explicitly, this court, sitting as a High
Court of Justice is obliged to guarantee these freedoms and to
bestow the remedy applied for by the citizen when one of his ba-
sic rights was injured by an act of government. 29
Although the Knesset can override a special judicial decision and
can interfere with the structure of the judicial branch by changing
its authority, some legal experts believe that the lack of a written
constitution adds to the Supreme Court's power.30 Since Israeli
judges are not restricted by a constitution, they have a wide range
of freedom and are not open to a formal complaint for exceeding
sec. 7. I1 L.S.I. 157.
26. Ha'aretz Newspaper, supra note 11. The court stated:
The absence in the State of Israel of a single statutory enactment bearing a superior
legal status and consolidating constitutional principles does not mean that we lack
statutory provisions of a constitutional nature or that our system does not possess
constitutional judicial principles, which define basic rights of the individual and citi-
zen. The law in force in Israel embraces ... basic rules concerning the existence
and preservation of individual freedoms, and this is true even though the Basic Law:
Rights of Man and Citizen Bill has not yet been made a Statute.
id.
27. Ulpanei Hasratta Be Israel, Ltd. v. Ger, and the Films and the Plays Censorship
Minister of Interior, 16 (I1) P.D. 2407 (1962).
28. H/C 152/71, 2591 P.D. 767 (1971).
29. Id. at 782.
One legal expert used an Israeli Supreme Court decision and a U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion to compare the similar view that courts have concerning their responsibility for safe-
guarding basic freedoms. Hausner, The Rights of the Individual in Court, 9 Is. L. REV. 478
(1974). The Supreme Court of Israel has stated:
This court is the most objective mainstay which the individual can have in his dis-
pute with the authorities .. .there is not limitation on our task, whether substan-
tive, procedural or remedial, other than the limits that the court, guided by its sense
of proportion and responsibility, will impose on itself.
Id. quoting Miron v. Minister of Labour, 24 (1) P.D. 340 (1970).
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated: "While the unconstitutional exercise of power by the
executive and legislative branches of government is subject to judicial restraint, the only
check upon exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint." Id. quoting U.S. v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 78-79 (1936).
30. Shetreet, supra note 22, at 979. Since there is no constitutional provision establish-
ing the functions and limits of the Supreme Court, the power of the Court is derived from an
evolutionary process consisting of the development of judiciary tradition and the role of the
judiciary in relation to the executive and legislative branches.
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their power. This contrasts with U.S. judges, who must act within
the framework of the Constitution.31
The pressing political and geographical realities, which have
caused the Israeli government to react by adopting stringent secur-
ity measures, have caused a counterreaction in the judiciary-the
liberalization of the legal system through its adherence to the basic
freedoms found in written constitutions of Western nations.32
The basic freedoms which have been granted by the U.S. Consti-
tution have been granted to the citizens of Israel through the Israel
Common Law and legislative process. "It is a prohibition and not a
permission that requires a basis in law and all that is not expressly
prohibited by the legislation is permitted."33 The Supreme Court of
Israel has recognized and protected fundamental rights such as
freedom of the press,34 movement,3 5 worship,3 expression37 and
peaceful assembly.38
II. ISRAELI CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Rights of the Accused
Upon arrest, the Israeli suspect cannot look to a Bill of Rights
for protection. Instead, procedural safeguards built into the Israeli
Criminal Procedure Law provide the accused the basic rights
needed to receive a fair trial. Such rights include:
a. The right not to be tried twice for the same offense.39
b. The right to know the charge. 0
c. The right to defend."1
d. The right to examine the evidence."2
e. The right to be present and represented at trial.4 3
31. Lecture given by Amos Shapiro, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv
University (June 1989).
32. Bracha, supra note 23, at 110-111.
33. 16 AMER. J. OF COMp. L., supra note 20, at 409.
34. Kol Ha'am v. Minister of Interior, 7 P.D. 871 (1953).
35. El Chun v. Chief of Staff, 4 P.D. 34 (1950).
36. Peretz v. Council of Kfar Shmariyahu, 16 P.D. 2101 (1962).
37. Omar International v. Minister of Interior, 36 (I) P.D. 227 (1981).
38. H/C 148/79 Sa'ar et. al. v. Minister of Interior and Police, 34 (11) P.D. 169
(1980).
39. Israel Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version) of 1982, L.S.I. 1043, § 5
[hereinafter Israel Criminal Procedure Law].
40. Id. § 143.
41. Id. § 159.
42. Id. §74.
43. Egged Ltd. v. Sapir, et. al., 12 P.D. 739 (1957).
[Vol. 20
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f. The right to be presumed innocent."
g. The right to remain silent.4
h. The right to deny or admit facts."'
i. The right to examine and present witnesses.4 7
j. The right to appeal.48
1. Trial in the Absence of a Jury
Israel has never adopted the jury trial.49 It was believed that the
heterogenous population-in particular, the political and social dif-
ferences between Jews and Arabs-would not foster the concept of
a jury trial. Courts of first instance have either one judge or a mag-
istrate; felony trials have one or three judges depending on the se-
verity of the offense; and appellate courts have three or more
judges.50 Judges in Israel decide factual as well as legal issues. The
difference between questions of law and fact arise only upon appeal.
In reviewing a lower court decision, the appeals court may only
decide questions of law.51
An obvious weakness in the Israeli legal system is the possibility
that a particular judge in a case will be influenced by inadmissable
as well as admissable evidence. An israeli district Court judge has
pointed out that a judge's decision may be influenced by evidence
which that judge previously ruled to be inadmissable.52 In spite of
this, the Israeli public has a deep respect for the judge's expertise,
and therefore gives greater value to the judge's decision than would
be given to a jury made up of laymen.53
Israeli Criminal Procedure dictates a passive role for a judge at
trial. 54 In practice, the tendency has been for the judge to take a
44. See supra note 14.
45. Id. §§ 152, 161.
46. Id. § 152.
47. Id. § 174.
48. Id. § 198.
49. Ben Itto, The Rights of the Accused in Israel, 12 Is. Y.B.H.R. 128, 130 (1982).
50. Harnon, Criminal Procedure in Israel-Some Comparative Aspects, 115 U. OF P.
L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1967).
51. Id.
52. Ben Itto, supra note 49, at 134. "IT]he supposition, often reprinted, that profes-
sional judges are sufficiently in control even of their subconscious to be able to ignore infor-
mation ...has yet been scientifically tested." The author also has criticized the potential
for bias in decisions: "There also exists the problem of habitual criminals with whom all
judges in the community are familiar. Are we to say that they cannot get a fair trial?" Id. at
135.
53. Lecture given by S. Goldstein, Dean, Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jeru-
salem (Aug. 1989).
54. Harnon, supra note 60, at 1093. Israel Criminal Procedure Law, §§ 174 and 175,
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more active role. This is because many defendants go unrepre-
sented. Accordingly, judges feel obligated to play a more active role
in order to ensure a fair trial. 5
2. Right to Counsel
The Israel Supreme Court has established that "it is the right of
the accused to be represented before the court by an attorney
versed in the law." 6 The Israel Criminal Procedure Law of 1982
obligates the court to provide defense counsel only if the defendant
(I) faces a sentence of 10 or more years, (2) is under the age of 16,
(3) suffers physical incapacity, or (4) suffers mental illness." How-
ever, the court has the discretionary power to appoint counsel in
nonobligatory cases. 8 In a large number of cases where the court is
not obligated to appoint counsel, the court fails to do so.5 There-
fore, a large percentage of indigent defendants go through the legal
process unrepresented.
The right to counsel attaches as early as the preliminary proceed-
ings.60 However, in those cases in which the court is obliged to ap-
point a defense attorney, the appointment occurs only at indict-
ment. As already indicated, the judges take a more active role in
cases where the defendant is unrepresented. In such cases, the Is-
raeli judge questions the prosecution evidence and calls witnesses."
Although the present situation for indigent defendants is unsatis-
factory, the general view is that such a defendant is accorded a fair
which state:
174. A witness shall first be examined by the party who has called him; the opposite
party may then cross-examine the witness, and thereafter the party calling the wit-
ness may re-examine him; the court may allow a party to put additional questions to
the accused even after the close of his examination as aforesaid.
175. Upon the conclusion of the examination by the parties, the court may examine
the witness and may also ask him questions in the course of the examination by the
parties in order to clarify any matter raised therein.
Section 175 has been interpreted to acknowledge the passive role of the judge similar to the
U.S. judge. However, judges have also viewed Section 175 to grant a more active role when
the circumstances at trial require.
55. Ben Itto, supra note 49, at 133.
56. Egged Ltd. v. Sapir et. al., supra note 43, at 751.
57. Israel Criminal Procedure Law § 15.
58. Id. § 15(B).
59. The cases where the court is obligated to appoint counsel represent approximately
5-10 % of the total cases. Approximately 30% of the cases go unrepresented at the prelimi-
nary hearing stage and of those cases that make it to trial, 15 % go unrepresented. Lecture
given by R. Mann, Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University (June
1989).
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trial due to the intervention of the judge. 62
For reasons of public security, the police are authorized to post-
pone suspect-attorney communication through the first 48 hours of
arrest."3 The Israel Supreme Court has acknowledged that an attor-
ney may be denied access to his client when, for justifiable reasons,
the interrogation of the suspect necessitates his seclusion." Section
14 of the Israel Criminal Procedure Law restricts the suspect's
choice of counsel when security requires.65
3. Discovery
Israel has adopted a defense-oriented approach to criminal dis-
covery.66 In Tzinder v. Head of Police Investigation Dept.,67 the
Israel Supreme Court held that the court may grant discovery of
evidence relevant to the subject matter held by the prosecution
when deemed reasonable. The Israel Criminal Procedure Law of
1982 states: "Where a statement of charge has been filed in respect
of a felony or misdemeanor, the accused and his counsel . . . may
at any reasonable time, inspect the material of the investigation in
the possession of the prosecutor and make copies thereof."68 This
law does not include any rule in favor of the prosecutor for disclos-
ure of evidence.6 9
All requested evidence not submitted to the defense is in-
admissable at trial.70 The prosecution is required to deliver all
materials contained in the police files, including evidentiary mate-
rial not intended for presentation at trial.71 As a result of these
rules, police files contain complete witness statements for all wit-
62. Id.
63. Israel Criminal Procedure Law, § 31.
64. Yasin v. Attorney General, 17 P.D. 1541, 1570 (1963).
65. Section 14 states:
Where the Minister of Defence certifies in writing that reasons of state security
require such restriction, a suspect or accused shall not be entitled to be represented,
either in the investigation of the offence or during proceedings before a judge or
court, other than by a person authorized to act as defence counsel under section 318
of the Military Justice Law, 5715-1955.
66. Harnon, supra note 50, at 1101-1107.
67. H/C 147 10 P.D. 236 (1950).
68. Israel Criminal Procedure Law, § 74.
69. Harnon, supra note 50, at 1106.
70. Israel Criminal Procedure Law, § 77, which provides:
A prosecutor shall not produce any evidence in court nor call any witness, unless the
accused or his counsel has been given reasonable opportunity to inspect and copy
the evidence or the statement, if any, made by the witness in the investigation, ex-
cept where the right to do so was waived by them.
71. Section 74 includes every statement made by the defendant during investigation,
statements of witnesses and all police materials.
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nesses interviewed and all materials discovered through investiga-
tion. In order to avoid discrediting the prosecution at trial, all evi-
dentiary material that may weaken the prosecutor's case is also
included.72 These liberal discovery rules demonstrate a strong pol-
icy which favors providing the defendant with sufficient information
so that he may properly challenge the charge against him. These
rules limit the possibility that prosecutorial evidence will take the
defense by surprise at trial, and provide the defense attorney with
all the facts needed to properly assess the strength of the prosecu-
tor's case.
Despite this defense-oriented approach to discovery, defendants
charged with security offenses may be deprived of their right to
invoke these discovery rules. Where security considerations necessi-
tate, Israeli law prohibits the disclosure of all evidence deemed sen-
sitive to public review.73
4. Right to be Present at Trial
Section 138 of the Israel Criminal Procedure Law provides: "Un-
less otherwise provided by law, no person shall be tried in criminal
proceedings except in his presence." There have been very few
cases in which the accused was tried ex parte. However, Section
138 does provide for that possibility. In the case X. v. State of
Israel, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may be tried ex
parte so long as the court believes that his absence does not detri-
mentally influence his case."
5. Summary
Criminal defendants in Israel have substantial rights which en-
sure that they receive a fair trial. Israel has adopted many of the
procedures utilized by Great Britain and the United States to safe-
guard the rights of the accused. However, those defendants accused
of security offenses may find themselves deprived of the procedural
safeguards afforded to the majority of defendants. As previously
mentioned, the defendant's rights to discovery, counsel and pres-
ence at trial all have security law exceptions.
72. Libai, Twenty-five Years of Criminal Procedure in Israel, 10 Is. L. REv. 225, 237
(1975).
73. Israel Criminal Procedure Law, § 78, which states: "The provisions of section 74
shall not apply to material, concealment of which is permitted or disclosure of which is pro-
hibited by law."
74. 24 (1) P.D. 477 (1970).
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The Penal Law Revision concerning state security 5 is an exam-
ple of such an exception. Section 38 states:
Where the court is of the opinion that the security of the State
requires the observance of security to such an extent as cannot be
achieved by the means provided by any other law, it may order
that the accused or his counsel shall not be present at a particular
proceeding or shall not inspect certain evidence.7"
The defendant accused of a security offense such as treason may
not have to wait until court proceedings to learn that he has been
stripped of his rights; he usually faces this problem upon his
arrest.
77
B. Arrests and the Detention Process
The Supreme Court of Israel has recognized that Israeli citizens
have the right to freedom of movement and the right to resist un-
lawful arrest.78 A suspect who is arrested without a warrant can be
held for 48 hours before he must be brought before a judge.7" At
this point, the judge either orders the suspect to be released or or-
ders the detention extended. The judge has four different indepen-
dent criteria which can be used to justify extension of the detention:
1) to continue the investigation, 2) to avoid the obstruction of jus-
tice, 3) for preventive detention, and 4) based on severity of the
offense.80
If the judge bases the extension on one of the first three criteria,
the suspect will be detained for a period of 15 days. At the end of
this period, the detention can be extended by the judge for an addi-
tional 15 days. A suspect can have his detention extended a maxi-
mum of 30 days, after which an additional extension can only be
obtained with the approval of the Supreme Court. After indict-
ment, a new decision is made about whether or not the defendant
should be detained further. If the detention is continued, the de-
75. The Penal Law Revision (Concerning State Security), II L.S.i. 186 (1957).
76. Id. § 38.
77. Mordecai Vanunu realized this when he was abducted by the Mossad (Israeli In-
telligence) and coerced to return to Israel to face trial, which was held in camera. The for-
mer employee of the Israeli Nuclear Power Center at Dimona was charged with high treason
after a foreign newspaper ran a story on Israel's nuclear capabilities based on information
provided by Mr. Vanunu. Amnesty International Report 1988, at 240.
78. Al Karbatli v. Minister of Defense, 2 P.D. 5 (1949); El Chun v. Chief of Staff,
supra note 35; Frenks v. Attorney General, 5 P.D. 1002 (1951).
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fendant will be detained until the end of the legal process."1 It is
common for defendants to be detained until the end of the legal
process. For example, in 1983, of all defendants who were indicted
in the District Court of Tel Aviv, approximately 50% were de-
tained until the end of the process.82
Severity of the offense is a highly criticized basis for the exten-
sion of a detention and is not used in the U.S. criminal justice sys-
tem. A suspect whose incarceration is extended because he is ac-
cused of an offense so serious that public safety demands continued
detention, is usually held until he is proven innocent.83 Suspects
who were not dangerous to the public have been detained until the
completion of the trial only to be acquitted.84 Because of harsh con-
ditions in the jails, suspects who are innocent until proven guilty
must bear unacceptable hardships. 85 Perhaps the best example of
the need for reform of detention procedures in Israel relates to a
problem common to many legal systems---case backlogs. As a re-
sult of a burdensome case load, the initial hearings after the first 48
hours are not granted the attention warranted and judges usually
give a cursory review of the grounds for detention.8 In this respect,
the defendant may be denied a fair hearing, especially when the
defendant is unrepresented.87
Other arrest procedures have been widely criticized. Concerning
police arrests, one Israeli commentator charged that "[t]he police
seem to exercise the power of arrests too easily and not always with
sufficient reasons. Only a small percentage of the persons arrested
are eventually prosecuted." 88 After claims demanding reform of
brutal investigation practices were publicized, the Eitan Sirota
Commission was established to address this problem. 9 The Com-
mission recommended that a task force be set up and that the pub-
lic be granted access to the Attorney General in order to lodge
complaints of police brutality.9" In spite of the government's at-
81. From a lecture given by Robert Mann, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Tel
Aviv Universit, (June 1989).
82. Id.
83. Ben Itto, supra note 49, at 132; Israel Criminal Procedure Law, § 34, which pro-
vides that bail may be denied to those accused of committing an offense under the Penal Law
Revision of 1957.
84. Id. at 132.
85. Id. at 131-32.
86. Id. at 131.
87. Id.
88. Shetreet, supra note 17, at 314.
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tempt to reduce police brutality, the problem still exists.
Section 30 of the Israeli Criminal Procedure Law allows incom-
municado detention when:
1) The Defense Minister believes that such a measure is necessi-
tated by national security; or
2) The Inspector General believes that "secrecy is required for
the sake of the investigation."
In light of claims of police brutality, a procedure allowing a suspect
to be detained incommunicado for 48 hours must be condemned.
Since lawyers cannot meet with. their clients during the first 48
hours, Section 30 has led to many investigation-induced
confessions. 2
This section has discussed the basic rights granted to the accused
by Israeli criminal procedure. Under certain circumstances, when
the a suspect is accused of committing an offense deemed a threat
to national security, the system strips the suspect of his procedural
rights. The following section discusses these security laws which
justify the violation of a suspect's procedural rights.
III. EMERGENCY REGULATIONS
Since 1948, a state of emergency has been proclaimed in Israel."3
Six wars and repeated hostilities have brought about security de-
mands which justify the continuing state of emergency. To assist
the military, the Knesset has enacted three laws which grant them
the power to exercise certain security measures when the situation
requires:
1) The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945"' are security
laws which were enacted by the British Mandatory Authority and
were later adopted by Israel. These regulations empower the mili-
tary to obstruct freedom of movement, disband unlawful associa-
91. Israeli Criminal Procedure Law, § 30, which states:
a) Where the Minister of Defense has certified in writing that reasons of state se-
curity require that the arrest be kept secret, or the Inspector General of Police has
certified in writing that such secrecy is required for the sake of the investigation,
then notwithstanding the provisions of section 27 or any other law, a judge of a
District court may authorize that information of the arrest of a person for a felony
shall not be communicated, or that it be communicated only to such person as the
court may determine.
b) An authorization under this section shall be valid for a period not exceeding 48
hours; it may be extended from time to time, provided that such periods do not in
the aggregate exceed seven days.
92. Ben Itto, supra note 49, at 132.
93. Official Gazette, No. 2, 1948, at 6.
94. 2 PALESTINE GAZETTE, No. 1442, at 1055 (1945).
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tions and set curfews when security requires such actions.9
2) Section 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinances of 194896
grants emergency powers to the legislature, allowing it to pro-
claim a state of emergency and to enact emergency regulations in
order to protect state security. 7 In so doing, the legislature can
derogate from any existing laws.9 8 Such powers have been exer-
cised mostly during times of war. 99
3) Emergency Powers (Detention) Law of 1979,00 grants the De-
fense Minister the power to issue administrative detention for up
to six months when he has reason to believe that a person poses a
threat to national security.' 01 Such a procedure may only be exer-
cised during a state of emergency. Although rarely used in Israel,
such a law gives the government the statutory means to com-
pletely circumvent the criminal process in which a suspect must
be accused of having committed a particular offense. The major
justification for such an action is the avoidance of publication of
classified information by way of the courtroom." 2 The only judi-
cial limitation on this power is that approval by a District Court
judge must be obtained.'0°
In Kahane v. Minister of Defense,104 the Minister of Defense or-
95. These regulations were established by the British in order to exercise security
measures over the Jewish and Arab population during the mandate period. The Jews had
criticized these regulations in 1945 for the ambiguous and ad hoc manner in which they were
exercised. The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 have been maintained by the gov-
ernment for two reasons: (1) the security situation required that power be given to the mili-
tary in order to protect the country and (2) the Israeli government had found a convenient
excuse for the abridgement of civil liberties in emergency regulations originating from the
British. See Bracha, Restriction of Personal Freedom Without Due Process of Law Accord-
ing to the Defense.(Emergency) Regulations, 8 Is. Y.B.H.R. 296, 300 (1978).
96. Official Gazette, No. 2, 1948, Supp. A, at 1.
97. Section 9(a) states that the Knesset has the power to "declare that a state of
emergency exists. . .and make such emergency regulations as may seem to be expedient to
the interests of the defense of the state, public security and the maintenance of supplies and
essential services."
98. Section 9(6), which states that emergency regulations "may alter any law, sus-
pend its effect or modify it."
99. Bracha, Addendum: Some Remarks on Israeli Law Regarding National Secur-
ity, 10 Is. Y.B.H.R. 289, 296 (1980).
100. L.S.I. No. 930, at 76. This statute replaced Regulations II I-I 12(b) of the De-
fense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, which were considered intolerably stringent. She-
treet, supra note 17, at 317 n. 43.
101. 99 L.S.I. No. 930, at 76, § 2.
102. Shetreet, Limits and Promises of International Norms and Procedures: The
Transnational Protection of Human Rights, ISRAEL REPORTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CON-
GRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 16-17 (1986).
103. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law of 1979, L.S.I. No. 930, at 76, § 4.
104. Appellate File 1/80, 35 (11) P.D. 253 (1981). Rabbi, Meir Kahane is the leader
of the ultra-extremist Kach organization. A former member of Knesset, he was denied the
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dered the defendant to be detained for six months after receiving
information from Israeli intelligence that the defendant was a se-
curity risk. The defendant was also denied his right to appear and
to be represented at the Supreme Court review of the evidence used
to order the detention. The Supreme Court held that detention or-
ders shall be granted only if "it is proven that the risk of security
. . . is so serious that it is necessary to infringe upon the rights of
the detained."' 5 After examining the evidence, the Court deter-
mined that administrative detention was the only way of preventing
a serious risk of danger to the public, and that protection of the
sources of the evidence justified the denial of the defendant's right
to trial.'0 6
The statutory restriction that all administrative detentions must
be approved by the District Court has played an increasing role in
limiting their use. This is due to the increased judicial scrutiny of
security action. 0 7 In a May 1948 opinion, the Israel Supreme
Court stated:
It cannot be disputed that despite the harshness which the use of
these regulations sometimes involves, an orderly community in a
state of emergency cannot exist without emergency regulations,
which, in their very nature, place the interests of the public above
the freedoms of the individual.'
Since 1948, the Supreme Court has demonstrated increased will-
ingness to scrutinize security action. The subsequent change in atti-
tude of the Court to the continuous state of emergency and defense
regulations is typified by Supreme Court Justice Haim Cohn, who
has stated, "even in respect of all emergency laws and regulations,
judicial control has at all times been, and will continue to be very
zealous, and readily available to watch over the civil and military
administration to insure that nobody exceed or misuse the authority
vested to him by law."'0 9
This trend is apparent in Electricity Corp., Jerusalem District,
105. Id. at 257.
106. Under Section 4(c) of the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law of 1979, the Dis-
trict Court is to be provided with the evidence upon which security forces based their deci-
sion. However, in Kahane, the Supreme Court held that "the court will not place its consid-
eration in place of the Minister of Defence" and that the court would "examine if the
Minister had a reasonable cause for assuming that the conditions for issuing an order pursu-
ant to Section 2(a) had been fulfilled, and this constituted an examination according to an
objective test."
107. Shetreet, supra note 17, at 317-18.
108. Leon v. Bubeznik, H/C 5/48, I P.D. 58 (1948).
109. Cohn, supra note 8, at 457.
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Ltd. v. Minister of Defense, ° in which the Court clearly defined
the limits of rights violations for the sake of security:
The duties and powers of a military government are determined
by its own military .needs, on the one hand, and by the need to
secure, as much as possible, the continuity of regular life of the
civilian population; the military authorities are bound to respect
existing laws and the vested rights of the population in the area
under their control. This is in the spirit of Article 43 and 46 of
the Hague Rules."'
In Dwikat v. State of Israel,"2 the Court held that it will ex-
amine the decision making process leading to the exercise of secur-
ity measures in order to determine if the measures taken were ap-
propriate. This case represents a new trend and major change from
the standard used in previous cases." 3 Before Dwikat, the Court
agreed to hear only those cases in which the appellant was chal-
lenging jurisdiction or process of administration." 4
Amnesty International" 5 has always been critical of the use of
administrative detention in Israel."' That organization has ex-
pressed the following concerns about administrative detention:
1) Administrative detention is sometimes used when detainees do
not pose a significant threat to national security. Instead, individ-
uals are detained as "prisoners of conscience for nonviolent exer-
cise of freedom of expression."'' 7
2) Detainees' rights are subject to abuse due to the inadequacy of
procedural safeguards. The major problem is that detainees and
their lawyers are not provided with adequate information about
the reasons for arrest. Even though a detainee's lawyer is able to
question state evidence at the judicial hearing, adequate evidence
needed to challenge the detention is rarely provided."" In addi-
tion, security laws allow the judge to deviate from the normal
110. I P.D. 124 (1973).
Ill. Id. at 138.
112. 34 (11) P.D. 1 (1974).
113. See H/C 302/72 Hilu et. al. v. State of Israel, 27 (11) P.D. 169, which limited
judicial review to the determination of whether or not the Military Commander acted in
good faith.
114. Shetreet, supra note 17, at 319.
115. Amnesty international is a worldwide movement of people acting on the convic-
tion that government must not deny individuals their basic human rights. The organization
was awarded the 1977 Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts to promote global observance of the
United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
116. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, 1986, 1987, 1988.
117. Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Administrative De-
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rules of evidence of criminal trial to admit all evidence that draws
light on the case." 9
Administrative detention has rarely been used in Israel. 2 '
Hence, it may be claimed that stringent security measures are jus-
tified to deal with those few people who threaten national security.
However, this claim is ill founded when one considers that in order
to handle those few cases, the Israeli government has enacted elab-
orate security laws. The mere existence of such laws could, if na-
tional security demanded, lead to their increased use. The potential
that severe security measures might be exercised on a wide scale
poses a great threat to the Israeli public.
Since the outbreak of the Intifada in the Israeli Occupied Terri-
tories in December 1987, more than 130 Israelis have been de-
tained.121 The purpose of the next Section is to examine the use of
security laws in the Occupied Territories which are identical to
those in place in Israel, in order to demonstrate the reality that
there is the potential for their wide scale use in Israel proper as
well as in the Occupied Territories.
IV. SECURITY LAWS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
A. Background
The West Bank and Gaza Strip were occupied by Israel as a
result of the Six Day War in June, 1967. On July 7, 1967, the
Israeli Military Commander was vested with all the powers of gov-
ernment, legislation and administration of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. 2 The Israeli military government administers these territo-
ries as a belligerent occupant. The administration of a belligerent
occupant is designed to control the local population after a war un-
til a political solution is reached between the parties of the con-
flict. 123 There are two international law treaties concerning belliger-
ent occupancy: the 1907 Hague Convention IV, Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,'124 and the
1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to The Protection of Civilian
119. Id. at 19.
120. Id. at II.
121. Id.
122. Proclamation No. 2, § 3, June 7, 1967.
123. Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, 8 Is. Y.B.H R. 104,
104-07 (1978).
124. Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
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Persons in Times of War.'""
Two systems of law exist in the Occupied Territories: local and
military. 2 The first system consists of the local law of Palestine
which is administered by the local municipalities. The second sys-
tem is that of Israeli Military Courts which hear cases concerning
violations of security laws enacted by the Israeli Military
Command.127
Exclusive jurisdiction over all civil cases is granted to the local
courts. Concurrent jurisdiction is shared by the local and mili-
tary courts for violations of criminal laws which were enacted by
either local legislation12  or Israeli military command. 130 The local
courts have no jurisdiction over persons serving in the military, gov-
ernment or army.1 3 1
The Supreme Court of Israel has established that all military
courts in the West Bank and Gaza must adhere to the basic legal
principles followed by Israeli courts.' 32 Therefore, the military
courts apply Israeli rules of evidence and procedure and have main-
tained such safeguards as the rule that the conviction of a suspect
may not be based solely upon his confession.'
The Hague Regulations established the guidelines for the actions
of an occupying power. They endowed the occupier with the power
125. Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
126. COHN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 93 (1985).
127. Article 66 of the Geneva Convention IV, supra note 125, which states: "[T]he
occupying power may hand over the accused to its properly constituted, non-political military
courts, on the conclusion that said courts sit in the occupied country."
128. Since the Regional Commander is empowered to enact new law where appropri-
ate, such enactments are binding on the local courts. See The Rule of Law in the Areas
Administered by Israel, THE ISRAEL NATIONAL SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMIS-
SION OF JURISTS 23 (1981) [hereinafter The Rule of Law].
129. Reicin, An Analysis of Measures Employed in Israel in the Administered Terri-
tories, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 515, 531 (1987).
130. Similar to Israeli law, local Palestinian law is made up of a conglomerate of legal
theories of the Ottoman and British Empires. However, during the years 1948 to 1967, the
West Bank was ruled by Jordan, and Gaza was administered by Egypt. Therefore, the major
legal force in place in West Bank local law is Jordanian, while local law in Gaza mostly
comprises Egyptian military law. Local law remains intact in both the West Bank and Gaza
except for East Jerusalem which was annexed by Israel on July 30, 1980. Cohen, Justice for
Occupied Territories? The Israel High Court of Justice Paradigm, 24 COL. J. INT'L LAW,
471, 489 (1986).
131. Dinstein, supra note 123, at 115.
132. Muhamed Mahmond Ali Elgaton v. Composition of Military Court in Gaza, H/
C 179/80, 34 (IV) P.D. 411 (1980).
133. Appeal No. 855/77 Sharf & Marrabin v. State of Israel, P.D. (I1) 432 (1979).
This is in conflict with Article 9 of the Security Provisions Order of 1967, which states: "As
regards the law of evidence, military courts shall proceed according to the rules prevailing in
military tribunals trying soldiers. However, a military court may deviate from the rules of
evidence for special reasons which shall be recorded, if it deems it just to do so."
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to take those measures needed to maintain the safety and order of
the local population upon the condition that it acknowledged the
laws of such population. The regulations state that the occupier
should avoid enacting new legislation and amending local law un-
less prevented by security matters."' The generally accepted view
is that where military needs require changes, the occupier may
amend local law.135 Changes or amendments to local law by the
Israelis have amounted to approximately 12.5% of the local
laws. 1 36
1. Right to Counsel Under the Security Laws
Palestinian suspects who are tried in military courts are granted
the right to counsel with the stipulation that "there is no obstruc-
tion from the point of view of security to holding the meeting, and
the meeting will not impede the course of the investigation. 1 37 In
addition, military law obligates the military courts to appoint coun-
sel to unrepresented suspects of serious crimes. 8'
2. Right to a Fair Trial Under the Security Laws
In theory, the suspect tried in military court should receive the
minimum procedure required by international law for a fair trial.
In practice, this is not the case, because most suspects and their
lawyers cannot be present when the military prosecutor presents his
evidence. In Alshueybi et. al. v. Military Supervisor of the Judea
and Samaria Region, 39 the Supreme Court held that privileged ev-
idence may be concealed from the defense based on security consid-
erations. The Court stated:
134. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations IV , supra note 124 states:
The authority of the power of the state, having passed de facto into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall do all in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, respecting at the same time, unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country.
135. Reicin, supra note 129, at 521.
136. Cohn, supra note 126, at 93. See also Christian Society for the Holy Places v.
Minister of Defense, H/C 97, 72 P.D. 26 (1972), in which the Israel Supreme Court ad-
dressed the problem of maintenance of local law, as required by Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations, while at the same time meeting the needs of changes due to prolonged occupa-
tion. The Court sanctioned amendments to local law by the Military Administration so long
as the new law relates to economic and social conditions. The U.S. State Department has
found that Israel has significantly changed local law. See U.S. Department of State, The
Occupied Territories, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (1988).
137. Order Concerning Prison Installation, 1967 Order No. 29, C.P., Vol. 2, at 56.
This ordinance is similar to the requirements of Article 72 of the Geneva Convention IV.
138. Id. § IV, at 14.
139. H/C 19/86, 40 (I) P.D. 219 (1986).
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An application for disclosure of privileged evidence will be re-
jected if the Court is convinced that the competent authorities
sincerely and in good faith fear that the disclosure of the evidence
would entail revelation of information that might constitute a
considerable security danger, or revelation of secret information
sources; and this fear should not be unreasonable. 4 '
3. Right to Appeal Under the Security Laws
Military law provides that a defendant may appeal a military
court decision by filing an application to the Regional Com-
mander. 41 However, in Argov et. al v. Commander of I.D.F.
Forces in Judea and Samaria Region et. al,5 42 the Supreme Court
of Israel held that the right to judicial review of military court
judgments is not a basic right aknowledged by Israeli law. In addi-
tion, neither the Hague Regulations nor the Geneva Convention IV
requires judicial appeal.
In 1968, the Israeli Attorney General authorized the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court over the Occupied Territories. 43 There is no
historical precedent for the Supreme Court of an occupying power
to exercise jurisdiction over its own military administration in an
occupied territory. However, international law allows the Court's
jurisdiction over the nation's military in occupied territories. 144 Is-
raeli law extends this jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to the acts
of Israelis in those territories. 14a
This assumption of jurisdiction over the Occupied Territories by
the Israel Supreme Court affords the local inhabitants the right to
appeal to the Court. Such a grant to appeal to the High Court of
the occupying nation is unprecedented in the history of belligerent
occupation.1 46 Between 5-10% of the annual petitions to the Su-
preme Court are brought by Palestinians. 14 7 In the absence of a
right to appeal to the Israeli courts, the population of the Occupied
Territories would have no remedy to challenge the administrative
140. Id. at 220.
141. Security Provisions Order of 1967, Article 43 states: "'There shall be no appeal
against judgment to a judicial instance, but the convicted person may make appeal and ap-
plication to Regional Commander relating to the conviction of sentence."
142. H/C 87/85, 42 (1) P.D. 253 (1985).
143. For a detailed discussion of the assumption of jurisdiction over the Occupied Ter-
ritories, see Cohen, supra note 130, at 474-78.
144. Id. at 476-78.
145. Hilu v. Government of Israel, 22 (I) P.D. 169 (1972).
146. Amnesty International, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1984. 35 (1984).
147. Id. at 40-41.
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acts of the Military Command. In addition, the assumption of juris-
diction over the actions of the military administration has restricted
the Military Commander's power.148 For appeals from the Occu-
pied Territories, the Supreme Court reviews both military adminis-
trative law and military action based on: 1) international law, 2)
local law, and 3) Israeli administrative law.' 49
a. International Law-When a Palestinian petitions the Supreme
Court for relief against the actions of the military administration,
the Court will determine if the action is in compliance with applica-
ble international law. For instance, in Hilu et. al. v. Government of
Israel,'50 the Supreme Court stated that the needs of the Military
Commander are "what is required for the achievement of public
order and security in the territories [and what is] required for the
needs of the army of occupation."'' This ruling was based on the
Court's interpretation of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations
which states that the occupying force "shall do all in its power to
restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety."
The Supreme Court has declined to acknowledge the applicabil-
ity of the Geneva Convention IV to the Israeli Occupied Territo-
ries. Therefore, its review of the military administration has re-
ceived little applause from international law experts.""'
b. Local Law-The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945
govern security measures in the Occupied Territories as well as in
Israel.' 5a The Regulations of 1945 were enacted by the British
148. The Rule of Law, supra note 128, at 37.
149. Al Taliah Weekly Newspaper v. Minister of Defense, H/C 619/718, P.D. 323
(1979).
150. 27 (11) P.D. 119 (1971).
151. Id. at 121.
152. In Sheik Suliaman Abu Hilu v. Israel, H/C 302/75, 27 (11) P.D. 169 (1975), the
Supreme Court determined that where Israeli law is inapplicable, customary international
law will be applied. Therefore, insofar as the Hague Regulations were not contrary to local
statutory law, and are part of customary international law, they are binding on the military
administration. In Ayyub, et. al. v. Minister of Defense et. al., 33 (II) P.D. 113 (1979), the
Court denied a Palestinian petitioner the right to invoke Article 49 of the Geneva Conven-
tion IV in a complaint against the Military Commander. The Court held that because the
Geneva Convention was a treaty, it could only be invoked by a party to the treaty. In Dwikat
v. Israel, supra note 112, the Court held that the Geneva Convention IV was conventional
law, and because the Israeli legislature has failed to adopt conventional law, it is not applica-
ble to the West Bank and Gaza. This decision was recently upheld in Ibrahim Sagida et. al.
v. Minister of Defense, H/C 258/85, App. H/C 323/88 (1988). See Tabari, Humanitarian
Law: Deportation of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J.
555 n.21 (1988)(criticizing these Supreme Court decisions).
153. Official Gazette, No. 1442, Supp. 2, at 855.
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Mandatory Council and applied to all of the British Mandate."
Because these regulations were not repealed by the Jordanians
when they controlled the West Bank,155 they continue to be a part
of the local law and may be exercised by the Military Com-
mander.' 56 Israeli courts have consistently upheld the applicability
of the Regulations. 57 The Israel Supreme Court has relied on pre-
vious Jordanian Supreme Court decisions which held that the Brit-
ish Defense (Emergency) Regulations were valid law.' 58
c. Administrative Law-The Israeli legal system does not have
jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza. However, in Hilu v.
Government of Israel,59 the Israel Supreme Court determined that
it had jurisdiction over the acts of the government.' 60 The Supreme
Court has also held that Israeli law is applicable to the government
of the Military Commander,' 6 ' and therefore, the Court has the
power to review all enactments of law and measures taken in order
to protect of human rights.
An occupying power's legal system will always be open to criti-
cism because the underlying interest to be protected by the legal
system is that of the occupying power, not that of the local popula-
tion. As already discussed, the accused tried in a military court is
afforded the minimum procedural safeguards sanctioned by inter-
national law, including the right to counsel and appeal. However,
military ordinances allow the military judge to derogate from rules
of evidence in order to avoid disclosure of classified evidence. 2 In
154. Palestine Gazzette, supra note 94. The Palestine Gazette was the local magazine
which announced the British orders. The-West Bank and Gaza were included in the British
Mandate.
155. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was in control of the West Bank from May
1918 until June 1967.
156. Annexation of the West Bank Law, § 2 (1950) reported in I Jordanian Official
Gazette 52 (1950). When Jordan annexed the West Bank in May 1918, this statute pro-
claimed that all prior law would remain in effect.
157. As recent as 1986, the Israel Supreme Court has held that the Defense (Emer-
gency) Regulations of 1945 were established law in the West Bank prior to the Israeli occu-
pation, and therefore, constitute valid local law. H/C 897/86 Jab'r v. I.D.F. O.C. Central
Command and Minister of Defense, 41 (11) P.D. 522.
158. Qawasma v. Minister of Defense, 36 (1) P.D. 666 (1982), which cited Al Hadidi
v. Inspector General, I Jordanian Bar 726 (1954). In this case, the Jordanian court held that
the Regulations were retained by the Jordanians.
159. Supra note 150.
160. Id. at 172.
161. Ali Elgazuwi v. Composition of Military Court, H/C 79/80, 34 (IV) P.D. 413
(1980). In this case the Court stated that the discretionary power to exercise security mea-
sures is required to conform to the administrative law of Israel.
162. Security Provisions Order of 1967, art. 9, see supra note 133.
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such cases, the accused is deprived of his rights to receive sufficient
information as to the grounds of the charge, to appear and to be
represented in court. Since most offenders tried in military courts
are charged with violations of security laws, many defendants fall
victim to this reality.
B. The Exercise of Administrative Detention
The security laws provide the military commander with several
measures which may be implemented in order to maintain public
order and the security of the armed forces."' 3 Since administrative
detention is the only measure which is used in Israel to any extent,
our discussion will be limited to this measure." 4
1. International Law
Administrative detention is provided for by the Geneva Conven-
tion: "If the occupying power considers it necessary for imperative
measures of security to take safety measures concerning protected
persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assignment or to in-
ternment."' 6 5 Administrative detention occurs when a person is in-
terned by the occupying power as a potential security threat. 6 ' The
process consists merely of the issuance of an administrative decree;
therefore, it circumvents the judiciary process."6 7 Administrative
detention is an administrative process which is preventative, as
163. Supra note 154.
164. The military commander has four principal measures at his disposal: 1) adminis-
trative detention; 2) curfews; 3) demolitions; and 4) deportations. Perhaps the reason why
these other measures are not used in Israel is their brutal nature. However, these measures
are widely used by the Israelis in the occupied territories. Consequently, Israel has been
condemned by the international community. For a detailed analysis of curfews, demolition
and deportations, see Reicin, supra note 129.
Supreme Court decisions relating to demolitions: A/C 361/82, Hamri v. Area Com-
mander of Judea 36 (111) P.D. 439 (1982) and Mouzlan v. Minister of Defense 36 (IV) P.D.
610 (1982).
Supreme Court decisions relating to deportations: Shakin v. Minister of Interior 34 (I)
P.D. 464 and Aggu Awad v. Regional Commander H/C 94/79, 33 (!11) P.D. 309 (1979).
See U.N. Security Council Resolutions 607 and 608 respectively 5/Res./607 (1988) and
Doc. 5/Res./608 (1988). See also Tabari, supra note 152.
165. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 125, art. 78.
166. "[A] belligerent may intern people or place them in assigned residence if it has
serious and legitimate reasons to think that they are members of organizations whose object
is to cause disturbances, or that they may seriously prejudice its security by other means,
such as sabotage or espionage..." UHLER & COURSUR, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949. INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS 258 (1958).
167. Dinstein, supra note 123, at 125-26. A detention decree is issued by the Military
Commander and is based on information obtained by the Israeli Secret Services or General
Security Services. The information concerns activities which conflict with the security poli-
cies of the administration. Detention During the Intifada, supra note 117, at 12.
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compared to imprisonment, which is judicially imposed and
punitive. 168
2. Israeli Law
The legal bases for the use of administrative detention are the
Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945,169 the Military Order
378 Concerning Security Provisions of 1970,170 and the Emergency
Powers (Detention) Law of 1979."'
Israeli laws concerning administrative detention clearly state that
it is a preventative measure and not punitive. 7 ' Therefore, the Mil-
itary Commander must determine that the detainee poses a threat
to security. 17 3 All detention orders are reviewed by a military judge
within 96 hours of their issuance.' 74  The judge is empowered to
confirm, cancel or shorten the time period. There are two officers
who have the power to issue a detention order. The District Com-
mander may issue a detention order for a maximum of 96 hours.
The Regional Commander may also extend all detentions issued by
the District Commander for up to six months. All detention orders
are subject to mandatory review every three months.175
The detainee is given the right to appeal to the military court.17 1
The detainee has the right to know the grounds of the detention,
and must be informed of the right to appeal. The detainee also has
the right to petition the Israel Supreme Court. 177
In 1980 an amendment was made to the existing detention laws
168. Dinstein, supra note 123, at 125-26.
169. Supra note 154, arts. 108 and I11.
170. Article 87 of Order 378 Concerning Security Provisions, Amendment No. 18, No.
815, (1970). Section 87(I) is similar to a provision of the Emergency Powers (Detention)
Law of 1979, infra note 171, which allows the judge to prohibit disclosure of classified
evidence.
171. L.S.I. No. 930, at 76. This law was enacted in Israel proper in 1979. In 1980, the
military government applied the Emergency (Detention) Law to the Occupied Territories via
administrative orders.
172. Article 87 of the Order Concerning Security Provisions, supra note 170, states:
"[wihen the Regional Commander has reasonable grounds for believing that the detention of
a person is necessary for reasons of regional or public security."
173. The Attorney General of Israel has stated that administrative detentions are
"generally invoked only in special circumstances and where there is corroborating evidence
from two or more sources that the individual is engaged in illegal acts that involve direct
danger to state security and to the lives of innocent people." In addition, such a measure was
exercised only when "normal judicial procedures cannot be followed because of the danger to
the lives of witnesses or because secret sources of information cannot be revealed in open
court." Amnesty International Report 1987, at 350.
174. Article 87(6), Order Concerning Security Provisions, supra note 170.
175. Shetreet, supra note 17, at 328.
176. Order Concerning Security Provisions, supra note 170, art. 43.
177. Reicin, supra note 129, at 538.
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requiring an objective standard of review.' 78 This standard requires
that the Military Commander show reasonable cause that the de-
tainee poses a threat to security.179 The objective standard increases
the court's power to rule on the detention order because it allows
the court to review the grounds for the detention. Under the prior
subjective standard, the court could only determine if the Com-
manders's decision was made in good faith. 8 '
The Court's willingness to invalidate detention orders based on
the objective standard is demonstrated in Qawasma v. Minister of
Defense.'8' Qawasma was tried and acquitted for past terrorist ac-
tivities, but was subsequently detained by the army until an appeal
was heard. The Court voided the detention order, holding that the
grounds for the order were not allowed by law. Section 2(a) of the
Emergency Powers (Detention) Law of 1979 states that if "the
Minister of Defense has reasonable cause to believe that reasons of
State or public security require that a particular person be de-
tained, he may detain such a person. .. I" The Supreme Court
held that it was clear that the detention order had been issued for
the object of holding the detainee until appeal. Because administra-
tive detention is a preventative measure and not penal, he could not
be detained for posing a future threat to security." 3
The Israeli Legislature and Judiciary have taken steps to curtail
the abuse of administrative detention. In 1979, the Knesset enacted
the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, which amended the previ-
ous British Regulations by' requiring automatic judicial review
based on the objective standard and limiting the detention period to
six months."8 4 This enactment pressured the Military Commander
to promulgate a similar law in the Occupied Territories. 18 5 This en-
abled the Israel Supreme Court to intervene in the military's exer-
cise of administrative detention. One commentator has praised the
combined efforts of the Knesset and the Supreme Court to restrict
the discretion of the Military Commander in order to decrease the
178. Order Concerning Security Provisions, supra note 166, Amendment 18.
179. Bracha, supra note 99, at 297.
180. Id.
181. Supra note 158.
182. L.S.I. 930, at 76.
183. Qawasma, supra note 158, at 668-69.
184. L.S.I. 930, at 76. See supra note 100. The six month period is renewable. See
infra note 200.
185. Order Concerning Security Provisions, supra note 170, art. 87. These orders led
to an immediate drop in the number of ralestinians detained. By the end of 1980, the year of
their promulgation, only seven people were detained in the Occupied Territories. Detention
During the Intifada, supra note 117, at 4.
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chances of arbitrary detention."8 6
As an added protection Israel has agreed to allow the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to interview detainees
within 14 days after their arrest. 87 According to the ICRC, this is
an exceptional grant. Regimes adhering to a policy of administra-
tive detention rarely afford the ICRC such an opportunity. 88 In a
1987 report, Amnesty International conceded that ICRC access to
detainees is a commendable gesture, however it felt that such con-
tacts with detainees had limited effect since they do not provide a
sufficient preventative measure against the harsh treatment of
detainees.' 89
Amnesty International has been extremely critical of the alleged
effectiveness of the procedural safeguards. The effectiveness of judi-
cial review is questionable because detainees are not given the evi-
dence against them and therefore cannot challenge the grounds for
their detention. 190 In addition, the refusal to disclose evidence and
sources due to security concerns may be used too often and has led
to imprisonment on the basis of anonymous testimony.19' The sever-
ity of administrative detention results not only in the deprivation of
the detainee's freedom of movement, but also in the detainee's sub-
jection to maltreatment: "some Palestinians from the Occupied
Territories have been hooded, handcuffed and forced to stand with-
out moving for several hours at a time for several days, and have
been exposed while naked to cold showers or cold air ventilators for
long periods of time.' 192
The record of Israeli utilization of administrative detention in the
Occupied Territories discloses a clear trend. With the onset of the
occupation in June 1967, Israel exercised administrative detention
on a wide scale in order to take control of the local population. In
1970, approximately 1130 Palestinians were interned in detention
centers throughout the West Bank and Gaza.' 9 ' As the occupation
continued, increasing stability in the region led to a decrease in the
exercise of administrative detention, and by 1978 only 20 to 30 de-
186. Reicin, supra note 129, at 543.
187. Goldring, Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli Occupied West Bank and Gaza:
Report to the National Lawyers Guild, 1977 MIDDLE EAST DELEGATION 28.
188. Id. at 28, quoting Alexander Hay, ICRC President.
189. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1987, at 351.
190. Id. at 350.
191. Id.
192. Torture in the Eighties, supra note 89, at 234.
193. Detention During the Intifada, supra note 117, at 3.
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tainees could be counted.194 In 1980, the announcement of military
orders amending the procedural rules of administrative detention
further diminished the number of detainees to 7.195 Political pres-
sures aroused by an intensification of terrorist activity generated a
reversal in the Government's policy regarding this security mea-
sure. The use of administrative detention was stepped up to
counteract the rise in terrorism. The result was that between mid-
1985 to December 1987, more than 300 Palestinians were behind
barbed wire fences. 96
The record shows that when the Israeli government is faced with
terrorism, it resorts to administrative detention as a means of sup-
pression, by the locking away of Palestinian activists. This depen-
dency became apparent during the recent Palestinian Intifada.
C. The Use of Administrative Detention During the Intifada 97
In September 1988, nine months after the outbreak of the In-
tifada, Israeli Defense Minister Rabin was quoted as saying:
By using various means at our disposal-military presence and
military operations, legal measures including the application of
the Emergency Regulations, administrative and economic
means-we are gradually achieving the results that the deploy-
ment of armed strength can achieve against a civilian uprising.'98
Since December 1987, approximately 18,000 Palestinians were ar-
rested,199 and greater than 5,000 have been held in administrative
detention.2"' The increased number of arrests was unexpected, and
it rocked the administrative structure and swamped the military
courts. The Military Commander broadened the scope of authority
to issue detention decrees by granting this power to low ranking
officers. Therefore, a procedural obstacle against arbitrary deten-
194. Id.
195. Id. at 4.
196. Id. at 5.
197. The Intifada, which means "uprising" in Arabic, began on December 9, 1987 and
is still in progress. The Intifada is a direct challenge by the Palestinian population in the
West Bank and Gaza to the Israeli occupation. This challenge is being made through out-
ward resistance consisting of demonstrations, strikes, rock throwing and the use of molotov
cocktails. LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AN EXAMINATION OF THE DETENTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS WORKERS AND LAWYERS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND THE
CONDITIONS OF DETENTION AT KETZIOT I (1988)(hereinafter "LAWYER'S COMMITTEE").
198. Jerusalem Post, Int'l Ed., Sept. 17, 1988, at 1.
199. LAWYER'S COMMITTEE, supra note 197, at 6.
200. Detention During the Intifada, supra note 117, at 1. Eighty percent of those
detained were held for six months, and 20% were held for longer than six months.
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tions was removed.2 0' In July 1989, the newly appointed Regional
Commander of the West Bank extended the period of detention
from six months to one year. Due to the backlog experienced by the
military courts, most arrestees were not immediately charged. 2 To
alleviate the voluminous caseload, the Regional Commander issued
military orders suspending automatic judicial review, which is man-
dated by law.203 Since the time lapse between a request for appeal
and the judicial hearing ranges from a few weeks to several
months, detainees may not be informed of the grounds for their
detention. 0 4 "Measures taken to crush the Intifada have caused the
complete deterioration of an already unfair military 'justice' sys-
tem. Sealed in the hands of the army, which arrests, interrogates,
charges, tries and sentences Palestinians with no checks or bal-
ances, the system is little more than a travesty of justice. 20 5
The shortage of judges and lawyers exacerbates the chaotic na-
ture of these proceedings.20 Defense lawyers face many obstacles
in dealing with these situations. Problems arise in determining
where a client is being held. Lawyers are then afforded limited ac-
cess to clients.20 7 Due to the burdensome case load, court hearings
are cursory and are concluded relatively quickly. 20 8 To vent their
outrage and frustration, Palestinian and Israeli lawyers engage in
periodic strikes.209 Perhaps the fact that many detainees are re-
leased without being formally charged best demonstrates the inade-
quacy of the system.210
The Emergency laws in force in the Occupied Territories provide
an effective weapon for suppressing the Palestinian revolt. Adminis-
trative detention is the favored tactic because it is efficient in re-
201. Id. at 6. Military Orders 1229 and 941 (for West Bank and Gaza, respectively)
empowered all officers beginning with colonels and above to issue detention decrees. This
abrogated Article 87 of the Order Concerning Security Provisions of 1970, which only
granted this authority to Regional and District Commanders. Immediately after the an-
nouncement of these orders, the number of detainees rose dramatically.
202. DATA BASE PROJECT ON PALESTINIAN HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PALESTINIAN IN-
TIFADA, 12-9-87 TO 12-8-88: A RECORD OF ISRAELI REPRESSION 63 (1989)(hereinafter "THE
PALESTINIAN INTIFADA").
203. Detention During the Intifada, supra note 117, at 6. Article 87(6) of the Order
Concerning Security Provisions of 1970 mandates automatic judicial review within 96 hours.
204. Detention During the Intifada, supra note 117, at 14.
205. THE PALESTINIAN INTIFADA, supra note 202, at 61.
206. Detention During the Intifada, supra note 117, at 15.
207. Lawyers are usually denied access to the detainee during the first eighteen days.
However, if the authorities believe that access to the detainee would frustrate the investiga-
tion, it may be denied indefinitely See U.S. Department of State, supra note 136.
208. INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, 1988 REPORT 45 (1988).
209. THE PALESTINIAN INTIFADA, supra note 197, at 61.
210. Id. at 32.
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moving Palestinian activists and demonstrators from the streets
with minimum violence. Its implementation by the Israeli military
has led to the mass detention of thousands of Palestinians. The In-
tifada has revealed the latent potential for the widespread use of
security laws. Identical security laws are in force in Israel. The
next section examines whether the current Israeli system can
counteract the government's propensity to resort to these laws
which infringe on civil liberties.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ROLE OF THE ISRAEL SUPREME
COURT
The Knesset has enacted security laws which infringe on the civil
liberties of Israeli citizens. One example is the Prevention of Ter-
rorism Ordinance. The Ordinance is a law aimed at fighting terror-
ism, as its name implies. 21 ' Article 4(h) prohibits any association
with officials of terrorist organizations and carries a maximum pen-
alty of three years imprisonment.212 Article 4(g) establishes as an
offense all forms of public expression, which promote terrorist orga-
nizations.213 This law, which restricts freedom of association and
expression is applicable not only in the Occupied Territories, but
also in Israel. In fact, Article 4(h) was enacted in order to deter
Israeli peace activists from meeting with members of the Palestine
Liberation Organization.21 Article 4(h) is a direct attack at politi-
cal opposition, while Article 4(g) is a statutory expression of the
government's inability to solve political incitement. Both laws
demonstrate that when the government fails to abate threats to se-
curity through other means, it resorts to the legal system.
Given the fact that all laws enacted by the Knesset must be en-
forced by the courts, how can this be reconciled with the judicial
recognition of freedoms of association and expression? This situa-
tion raises the issue of whether or not the Supreme Court of Israel
has the power to stave off security laws such as the Terrorism Ordi-
nance, which infringe upon the civil liberties of Israeli citizens. To
answer this question, two judicial trends must be examined. The
first trend is one of increasing judicial intervention in the action of
government. The second trend is the Supreme Court's movement
211. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1988, at 240-41.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. This year, Israeli peace activist Aby Natan was sentenced to six months in prison
for violating article 4(h) after meeting with Yasser Arafat.
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away from the principle of restrictive interpretation.
A. The Ascendancy of the Israel Supreme Court
Political and geographical realities have induced the Israeli gov-
ernment to enact stringent security legislation. In turn, the govern-
ment's mishandling of these realities has led the Israeli public to
enlist the assistance of the Supreme Court in scrutinizing govern-
mental actions.2 15 The Israel Supreme Court has responded to the
public outcry by stepping up its review of the administration in two
ways: judicial review of administrative action and Commissions of
Inquiry.216
I. Judicial Review of Administrative Action
The Supreme Court has become more persistent in its review of
"collateral proceedings challenging the validity of statutes which
are contrary to entrenched basic laws. 11 7 This can be seen in Berg-
man v. Minister of Finance.2"' In that case, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the Basic Law was binding authority which can
restrict the Knesset.
The Court's willingness to review administrative action is also
seen its open criticism of governmental circumvention of judicial
decisions.2"9 In Qawasma v. Minister of Defense,220 Justice Landau
attacked the executive for the deportation of three West Bank may-
ors before the Supreme Court could hear their petition. Landau as-
serted that "In times of hostilities about us, this Court . . . has
insisted on scrupulous observance of the rule of law even in times of
emergency." ' The Court held that the government had unlawfully
deprived petitioners of their right to appeal.222 In Dwikat v. State
of Israel,22 3 the Supreme Court determined that the erection of a
new settlement in the West Bank was not based on absolute mili-
tary needs, and therefore ordered an injunction against further
215. Shetreet, supra note 22, at 981.
216. Id. at 980-81.
217. Id. at 980. Regarding the basic laws, see supra note 16.
218. 23 (I) P.D. 623 (1969). The Court determined that a new financing law was
contrary to the principle of electoral equality established by Section 4 of the Basic Law
Concerning the Knesset.
219. Shetreet, supra note 22, at 981.
220. Supra note 158.
221. Id. at 670.
222. Id. at 671.
223. Supra note 112, at 983-90.
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building.22 All of these cases demonstrate the increased willingness
of the Supreme Court to intervene in administrative action.
2. Commissions of Inquiry
The Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1968225 provides for the es-
tablishment of Commissions of Inquiry to probe government scan-
dals and problematic issues on the national level. Supreme Court
Justices are appointed to head these Commissions.226 The influence
that these Commissions have had on the government is due to the
important subject matter addressed and public advocation for the
government's acceptance of their nonbinding recommendations.22 7
Three Commissions in particular have had a pronounced affect:
a) The Agranat Commission. This Commission investigated the
military's failure to detect the surprise attack at the outset of the
Yom Kippur War. Its findings unleashed public pressure which
eventually led to the resignation of Prime Minister Golda Meir.2 s
b) The Cahan Commission. The recommendations of this Com-
mission led to another resignation of a high ranking government
official. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was forced to relinquish
his post after the Commission found the Israeli Defense Forces
indirectly responsible for the Sabra and Shatalia massacres.229
c) The Landau Commission. In 1987, former Justice Landau rec-
ommended that the Israeli Secret Services be subject to greater
governmental scrutiny. The Commission revealed to the public
that for more than 10 years the security services had falsified
prosecutory evidence used to convict security offenders.23
Increased judicial review and Commissions of Inquiry have sig-
nificantly challenged the authority of the executive and legislative
branches of Israeli government. The effect has been the ascendancy
of the Supreme Court.2 3'
B. Broad Interpretation of Criminal Laws
Will the Supreme Court be able to preserve the civil rights of the
accused during a national emergency? In light of the findings of
224. Id. at 5.
225. L.S.I No. 548, at 28 (1969).
226. Shetreet, supra note 22, at 989.
227. Id. 983-90.
228. Id. at 984.
229. Id. at 985.
230. Detention During the Intifada, supra note 117, at 21.
231. Shetreet, supra note 22, at 980.
19891
33
Wolf: National Security v. The Rights of the Accused: The Israeli Exper
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1989
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
one Israeli legal scholar, the outlook that the Supreme Court will
fulfill such a function is bleak. 2 Mordecai Kremnitzer examined a
recent trend in the Supreme Court's interpretation in criminal law:
In recent years a new trend has appeared in decisions of the Su-
preme Court concerning the interpretation of criminal prohibi-
tions. According to this trend, a penal statute must be interpreted
in the same way as every other statute, there being no rule of
restrictive interpretation particular to criminal law. The inter-
preter must choose that interpretative option which best realizes
the objective of the legislation, even when the option is based on
the irregular and secondary meaning of the words. The legislative
objective is often identified by the court as the broadest possible
defense of the social interest protected by the norm.233
Mr. Kremnitzer has written that Israeli courts have traditionally
applied the rule of restrictive interpretation. According to this rule
courts interpret criminal statutes in a way that favors the defend-
ant's freedom of action. 3 4 This is usually achieved by the court's
adherence to the plain meaning of the words contained in a stat-
ute.235 The new trend allows a statutory interpretation that corre-
sponds to the intent of the legislature even if such an interpretation
deviates from the plain meaning of the words. Without a written
constitution, the court cannot strike down a law for being too
vague. Therefore, it may feel free to interpret a statute in a flexible
manner in order to best achieve the legislative objective underlying
the statute.23
The following example demonstrates the influence nonrestrictive
judicial interpretation will have on proceedings involving security
offenses. The Secret Monitoring Law of 1979 prohibits "unautho-
rized secret monitoring."237 However, secret monitoring may be au-
thorized when the Prime Minister or Defense Minister "is satisfied
that it is necessary to do so for reasons of state security." '238 Such a
justification is undeniably vague and lends itself to a broad inter-
pretation encompassing many reasons which may not be direct
threats to state security. If a court was free to interpret this statute
in a way that best fits the legislative intent, it would probably not
232. Kremnitzer, Interpretation in Criminal Law, 21 Is. L. REV. 358 (1986).
233. Id. at 358.
234. Id. at 365.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 371.
237. Secret Monitoring Law of 1979, L.S.I. (No. 938) 118.
238. Id., § 4A.
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review the minister's reasons for secret monitoring. Therefore, a de-
fendant accused of committing a security law offense based on evi-
dence obtained by a wire tap would find no remedy in judicial re-
view. Because nonrestrictive judicial interpretation allows a broad
interpretation of the words "necessary to do so for reasons of state
security,"23 9 the court would be less willing to review the discretion
of the defense minister by substituting its own discretion in order to
examine if the use of a wire tap was justified.
Under the traditional theory of restrictive judicial interpretation,
the court could review the decision-making process, requiring that
the minister's decision be based on necessity. Such an interpretation
would correspond to the plain meaning of the words of the statute
(i.e. that the ministers decision be based on absolute security
reasons) .20
The Supreme Court's partial abandonment of restrictive inter-
pretation will lead the court away from heightened judicial review
of governmental security actions. During a national emergency, the
Supreme Court can opt to give a broad interpretation to the secur-
ity laws. Thus, the Supreme Court has in effect removed the last
obstacle between the government and the accused: itself.
CONCLUSION
Since its inception, Israel has faced repeated threats to its exis-
tence and yet, has miraculously succeeded in establishing a working
democracy amid the chaos of the Middle East. The principles and
freedoms of enlightened western democracies are also deeply em-
bedded in the Israeli system of law. Despite its handicaps, the Su-
preme Court of Israel has counterbalanced the dictates of national
security through the liberalization of Israeli law. The result of this
liberalization is the predominance of civil liberties in Israeli law.
Israeli citizens, who are known cynics of all political institutions,
have a deep respect for the Israeli Supreme Court and have en-
couraged increased judicial scrutiny of the Israeli government. The
willingness of the Court to review the actions of the military ad-
ministration in the occupied territories is the outcome of the public
239. Id., § 4A.
240. In Dwikat v. State of Israel, supra note 112, the Supreme Court reviewed the
administrative acts of the government. The court held that the action was not justified be-
cause it was not based on "absolute military necessity". The Court adhered to tk theory of
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support and is to be commended.
The dynamics of this unstable region have generated pressures
not faced by most legal systems under normal circumstances. Just
as the tenuous political situation has led the military government to
promulgate harsh security orders in the Occupied Territories, it has
also provided impetus for the enactment of identical security laws
in Israel, even though the character of these laws contradicts the
democratic principles of the State. The fact that these laws have
latently been in force in Israel since 1948 raises the concern that
they will one day also be widely exercised in Israel. This concern is
exacerbated by Israeli criminal procedure, which is designed to
comply with the circumvention of its procedural safeguards. As our
examination of the Israel Procedure Law of 1982 has demon-
strated, when criminal proceedings involve security offenses, Israeli
law plays the role of chameleon and changes its liberal skin: the
suspect is deprived of his rights to a fair trial in order to facilitate
the government's efforts to combat threats to national security.
Such laws reflect an affinity to the system of martial law in the
Occupied Territories; one that seriously undermines the prestige of
Israeli law and its protection of civil liberties.
Enactments of oppressive security laws which derogate from the
ordinary rules of law are not predestined to vanish in the pages of
voluminous law books; they will eventually be used. The Intifada
has proven the inexorability of this eventuality.
During a national emergency, the interests of state security nor-
mally outweigh the rights of the individual. However in hindsight,
not all threats are justifiable grounds for the government's infringe-
ment of civil rights. According to U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Brennan, U.S. history demonstrates that "perceived threats to na-
tional security that have motivated the sacrifice of civil liberties
during times of crisis are often overblown and factually un-
founded." 24' Unfortunately, Israel has neglected to erect a system
of procedural safeguards designed to preserve civil liberties during
"perceived threats to national security." Instead, Israeli law leaps
to deprive those suspected of security offenses of the right to a fair
trial. The Supreme Court of Israel has in the past proven to be an
effective watchdog against the improprieties of government. How-
ever, absent a detailed jurisprudence granting the judiciary uncon-
ditional authority to review the government's justification for exec-
241. Brennan, supra note 1, at 19.
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utive implementation of emergency laws, the judiciary will be
subordinate to the executive and coerced to comply. Under the pre-
sent conditions, there exists the possibility that suspects accused of
committing security law violations will be subject to administrative
detention, or convicted without due process based on ambiguous se-
curity considerations.
Perhaps the true test of a democratic nation is how that nation
treats its minorities, ethnic and political, during periods of national
crisis. The potential that perceived threats to the government will
lead to the wide scale utilization of these security laws in Israel
exists as long as these antiquated laws remain in force. Therefore,
the author of this Comment recommends their abolishment.
This recommendation is made with the understanding that under
the present system of government, even if the security laws were
abolished, the Knesset could reactivate them whenever it deemed
necessary. In the absence of a constitution, these laws will always
remain an option to the Israel government. However, even a consti-
tution is not a panacea. As history demonstrates, the U.S. Constitu-
tion prevented neither the suspension of habeas corpus during the
civil war nor the internment of American citizens of Japanese de-
scent throughout World War 11.242 Therefore, any future Israeli
Constitution must contain provisions which establish a system of
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